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‘If these machines could talk…’: experts,
cigarettes and policymaking in Turkey
Inspired by the studies of Bruno Latour, the article aims to illustrate the ways in which policymaking is being
made within a ‘heterogeneous network’ of humans and non-humans. Through an analysis of a controversy, it
argues that the policymaking process is amore complicated andmultidimensional process, which cannot be simply
comprehended within the framework of predetermined roles and structures. Speciﬁcally, the article ethnograph-
ically investigates the policymaking practices of the Turkish tobacco regulatory agency, which was established in
2002 in return for a loan provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
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I n t r o duc t i o n
When regulatory agencies were consecutively established under the directives of the
international ﬁnancial institutions after the 2001 economic crisis in Turkey, they were
evaluated either as global entities that faithfully perform standardised international
policies or as local institutions that stick to national bureaucratic culture. Though these
explanations can be identiﬁed with two opposing arguments, such as with globalisation
or localisation perspectives, both of them share a common denominator: they both start
from a pre-existing order in which the actors pursue their self-interests. In other words,
in either case, policymaking practices are explained by overarching ﬁxed structures.
However, when I was doing research on the anthropology of the state, I started to
wonder if the policies of the regulatory agencies are solely a reﬂection of either global
or local interests. Or is it possible to see a different story if we do not ﬁrst start from the
‘social’? How can we explain the uncertainties and ambiguities in the policymaking
processes of these institutions? Moreover, what sort of ethnographic method can we
apply to expose various decisionmaking policies that are being constituted through a
myriad of relations between multiple actors?
Actor-network-theory (Callon 1999; Latour 1987, 1996a, 1999a, 2005a; Law
1999) seemed to me the appropriate method that could answer these questions by
providing ‘a toolkit for telling interesting stories about, and interfering in, those
relations’ with its receptivity to ‘the messy practices of relationality and materiality
of the world’ (Law 2009: 142). Grounded in empirical case studies, actor-network
theory aims to describe ‘many local places where the global, the structural, and the
total [are] assembled’ (Latour 2005a: 191). A good number of anthropological issues
are nowadays seen as being formed in ‘global assemblages’ (Collier and Ong 2005).
Studying global interconnectedness co-present with local situations requires multi-
sited research designs (Marcus 1995, 1998) that reinforce the importance of relationality
and ﬂuidity involving a multitude of actors. Rather than comparing readily deﬁnable
entities with recognisable boundaries, a multi-sited ethnography creates juxtapositions
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among a ‘variety of seemingly incommensurate sites’ and examines their connections
(Marcus 1998: 17). Like the science studies that abandon the ‘identity-dominated
cultural analysis’ (Rabinow et al. 2008: 39), this ethnography, as noted by Rees, is no
longer primarily concerned with ‘society’ and ‘culture’, but rather with the examination
of the ‘making’ of emergent forms of the rationalities, institutions and assemblages
(2008: 93). Discarding the pre-existing discourses about naturalised categories, Marcus
calls for a more complicated ﬁeldwork design, seeking to conﬁgure the analysis of
manifold ties among diverse sites previously considered to be unconnected (1998:
14).1 Thus, by following different people, things, metaphors, stories, biographies and
conﬂicts, a multi-sited approach has an afﬁnity with Latour’s studies, which tackle the
issue of ‘tracing the associations’ (Latour 2005a). Correspondingly, drawing from both
actor-network theory and multi-sited ethnography, this research aims to offset natural
categories or a priori assumptions about the ﬁeld, and seeks to disclose the hidden
connections among different sites.
Based on a two-year period of ﬁeldwork, this paper analyses the policymaking
practices of the Turkish tobacco regulatory agency, which was established in 2002 in
return for a loan provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank. It ethnographically investigates the policymaking process through an analysis
of a controversy. The controversy was about the purchase of hard-box cigarette
packing machines of the Turkish state-run tobacco monopoly. The political debates
about the purchase of machines led to a technical investigation of the conditions of
the machines. In the end, a decision was made about the machines; however, as the
controversy revealed, the ﬁnal verdict was made in an environment of uncertainty
and ambiguity, a fact that contradicts the assumptions that the regulatory institutions
generate the desired policies with their predetermined agendas.
Tracking conﬂicts has become one of the established methods used in anthropol-
ogy of law (Marcus 1998) and science studies (Turner 2001).2 According to Latour,
the cartography of controversies is today a full research method that exposes the dis-
cussions surrounding a technique or scientiﬁc fact that has not yet been determined.3
They indicate uncertain situations, which are not yet stabilised or closed. In a sense,
the analysis of controversies makes it possible to observe ‘what is happening inside’
before the ﬁnal decisions are made, and before disagreements are ‘black boxed’.
Moreover, they include not only human actors but also ‘natural and biological elements,
industrial and artistic products, institutional and economic institutions, scientiﬁc and
technical artifacts’ bywhich ‘the most heterogeneous relationships are formed’ (Venturini
1 See Hine (2007) on how science and technology studies have made use of multi-sited ethnography.
According to Hine, both approaches are very careful about the fact that the superimposition of the
methodological stances upon the situations would yield to straightforward linear stories and do in-
justice to the world as an inherently messy and complex place (2007: 663).
2 Several studies from different disciplines, such as communication, international relations, anthro-
pology and political science, have employed ‘following the conﬂict’ technique (see for several exam-
ples Besel 2011; Bueger 2011; Ginsburg 1989; Rademacher 2009). Also by adopting a political
science perspective, I examined the translation processes of regulatory agencies in Turkey through
the analyses of two controversies elsewhere (see Kayaalp 2012).
3 For more on controversies in Science Studies, see the website http://www.mappingcontroversies.
net. ‘Mapping Controversies on Science for Politics’ (MACOSPOL) is an EU project and a joint
research study that brings eight partner teams in science, technology and society across Europe to-
gether. Following Latour’s studies, the project aims to map out and analyse scientiﬁc and technical
controversies.
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2010: 261). This study thus examines the way the machine controversy evolved, how it
was settled and how a decision was made within a ﬂuid heterogeneous network. I argue
that an analysis of a controversy makes it possible to unfold the involvement and interac-
tion of a variety of actors, and their negotiations, conﬂicts and resistance with each other,
and lucidly illustrates that the regulatory process is a highly complicated and
multidimensional process, which cannot be simply comprehended within the framework
of predetermined duties and responsibilities of the agency.
There is an inclination to situate regulatory agencies in dichotomies between public
and private governance, or between regulation and deregulation, but such a
dichotomising approach is ‘far too crude to be truly helpful for thinking through
regulatory options’ (Riles 2011: 226). Studies adopting such a deterministic perspective
simply exhort the explanations that consider agencies make decisions with clear
insights and ﬁxed policies. First of all, such an approach granting full agency to the
institutional actors leaves little room for the role of other actors in the policymaking
process. In such a world, there would be no surprises or unintended consequences
but the straightforward implementation of clearly deﬁned policies. It is, however,
pertinent to note here that what I am proposing is not simply the blending of global
policies with the local bureaucratic culture, yielding to basically hybrid policies. Such
an argument still bears the traces of essentialised assumptions about global and local
settings. I argue that those studies relied on certain presuppositions that inevitably fail
to investigate the ‘present’ of the policymaking process because they focus on the
functioning of institutions merely in abstract time. However, in practice, regulatory
practices take place through the temporal negotiations of actors in real time. As Rees
rightly observes, ‘anthropologists are increasingly studying timely phenomena with
tools developed to study people out of time’ (Rabinow et al. 2008: 10). What is more
needed in the anthropology of the contemporary is to study the processes of interac-
tion, rather than the end results of the processes. In that sense, the Latourian analysis
of the ‘making’ of the decisions gains signiﬁcant importance to expose what is really
happening on the ground in real time.
The sociological certainty that draws all its strength from a priori assumptions
about the existence of social and institutional realms crumbles when it comes to analysing
experiences on the ground. As will be shown in this case study, the actors involved in the
policymaking process confront uncertainties in the legal and technical realms, and
respond to them in variousways. Beyond the seemingly bureaucratic rationalisation logic,
there lies a messy world governed by uncertainties. In this speciﬁc case, the ambiguity of
the related law, the uncertainty about the responsibilities of the regulatory agency and the
confusion about the status of the machines were all retrospectively ‘black-boxed’ factors
behind the apparently well-thought out and clear-cut decisions.
Regu l a t i n g unde r unce r t a i n t y
After two consecutive severe ﬁnancial crises (November 2000 and February 2001), a
new wave of far-reaching economic restructuring began in Turkey.4 The crises
4 While the 1980s are accepted as the ﬁrst generation economic liberalisation, the year 2001 is ac-
cepted as the beginning of the second generation economic reforms in which the ‘transnational mo-
bility of capital and global production networks were far more pronounced than before’ (Cizre and
Yeldan 2005: 389).
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generated an emergency situation in which a series of sweeping neoliberal policies were
implemented to ﬁx the collapsed economy. To receive the necessary loans from the
IMF and the World Bank, the government hastily enacted a number of laws, publicly
known as ‘15 laws in 15 days’.5 The tobacco law was one of them. It was ratiﬁed in
January 2002 and introduced the elimination of support purchases, the alteration of
tobacco marketing systems, privatisation of the state tobacco monopoly and the
establishment of a tobacco regulatory agency.6
Before the enactment of the tobacco law, the monopoly not only controlled the
production of tobacco, but also bought most of the product to support the cultivators
as a government policy. The international ﬁnancial institutions were concerned about
the existence of the monopoly: an institution guaranteeing a minimum price and
purchase of all tobacco and thus inhibiting the development of the free market. Conse-
quently, the tobacco regulatory agency was established to take over the state-run
tobacco monopoly’s previous regulating role in the market.7 The agency, in contrast
to the monopoly, is neither the buyer of tobacco nor the manufacturer of cigarettes
but an independent institution to regulate the sector.8 This sort of regulation in the
tobacco sector, imposed by the international ﬁnancial institutions, has been regarded
as the prerequisite for a competitive market economy, which aimed at diminishing
the role of the state and its intervention in the market.
I carried out a multi-sited (Marcus 1998) ethnography from September 2005 to
March 2008, which took place from the vast tobacco ﬁelds to fancy rooms of multina-
tionals, run-down ofﬁces of the tobacco monopoly, cubicles of the regulatory board,
formal corridors of the Assembly, dusty archives in libraries and the front seats of
tobacco experts’ cars in which we travelled to villages.9 During the course of ﬁeldwork,
I was stunned to see that none of my informants from the tobacco sector had a clue
why the tobacco law was enacted and the agency established. There were no explana-
tions, except that the agency was established in line with its commitments to interna-
tional ﬁnancial institutions. The short-cut explanation was that ‘the IMF wanted it!’
When I talked to the people working at the agency, I was also surprised to learn that
even they did not know the reasons for the foundation of the agency. The buzzwords
of the neoliberal era, such as efﬁciency, competition and liberalisation, which were
5 The Turkish government passed 19 important structural reform laws or regulations in less than a
year. The most signiﬁcant ones were the telecommunications law, sugar industry law, public pro-
curement law and tobacco law, which all required the establishment of regulatory agencies (Dervis
2005: 67).
6 ‘Tobacco, Tobacco Products and Alcoholic Beverages Market Regulatory Agency’ is the legal name
of the institution, which not only regulates the production and sales of tobacco but also of alcoholic
beverages. However, the alcohol and tobacco parts work under two different administrative divi-
sions, and this paper will not elaborate on the regulation of alcoholic beverages.
7 Soon after the law’s enactment, the state started the privatisation process of the monopoly. In June
2008, after the ﬁrst two unsuccessful attempts of privatisation, British American Tobacco won the
tender. However, long before the actual privatisation, the agency took over the tobacco monopoly’s
previous administrative role in the market.
8 The agency’s president and board members are chosen by the Council of Ministers from among
candidates proposed by the Ministries of Finance, Health and Agriculture, as well as the treasury,
the external trade bureau, chambers of agriculture and a related Ministry. In the ﬁrst inaugural
board, there were no farmers.
9 Tobacco experts are people who appraise yields. In general, the responsibility of tobacco experts is
to evaluate and determine the quality of crops during the entire process ranging from production to
consumption. The history of tobacco expertise as a profession dates back to the Ottoman Empire.
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widely used in the reports, speeches and interviews, turned out to be abstract, empty
concepts in colloquial conversations. Although neoliberal economics is implicitly
regarded as a model through which liberalisation policies are constructed, in reality
there was no real consensus about which particular policies the agency had to under-
take. While discussing pension reform in Mexico, Schwegler (2008) points out bureau-
crats’ different accounts of policy processes and demonstrates the incoherence in their
explanations. In a similar vein, in spite of an assumed consensus about the functioning
of the tobacco regulatory agency, the reality seems to be that its functioning is based on
very ambiguous processes and ad hoc practices. The bureaucrats at the agency create
decentralised improvisations beyond the rationales of state-centric or so-called global
standardised policies. The deployment of these practices is constituted through ambi-
guity and speculation while blurring the boundaries between public and private, state
and market, and regulation and deregulation.10
One of the reasons of this ambiguity is arguably the brevity of the tobacco law,
which consists of only 12 articles.11 As one of the chief experts in the agency frankly
confessed, the agency could have unlimited power or no power at all, depending on
how the law was interpreted.12 Therefore, it was hard to envisage the possible policies
of the agency. As Türem suggests in the case of the Turkish competition agency, ‘the
question as to why the agency is doing what it is doing has not been clearly answered’
(2011: 121). The practices of the agencies seem to be undertaken in an environment of
uncertainty. The decisionmaking, at least in the case of the tobacco agency, is often
executed in response to the expectations of other actors in the sector, which makes it
difﬁcult to predict the policies beforehand.
In spite of the erratic nature of the policymaking process, there is a tendency to
describe regulatory agencies working with a designated agenda for the beneﬁts of either
the state or the private sector. This does not of course mean that the practices of these
institutions can be placed outside of the political domain or devoid of power relations.
On the contrary, as many studies argue (Bayramoğlu 2005; Günaydın 2000; İslamoğlu
2002; Ozel, 2012; Ozel and Atiyas 2011; Sezen 2003, 2007; Sönmez 2004, 2011), the
common characteristics attributed to the regulatory agencies, such as autonomy,
neutrality, transparency or objectivity, are all disputable. It is certainly true that we
10 Both Baer (2011) and Verkaaik (2010) analyse the practices of local bureaucrats under ambiguous
conditions in different countries. Baer argues that in a political environment where the state
policies are ambiguous and opaque, local bureaucrats depend on decentralised and speculative
planning, which leads to outcomes entirely different from the plans initially outlined. Similarly,
through an analysis of Dutch naturalisation rituals, Verkaaik states that local bureaucrats have
no obvious models or experts to consult, and during this process, not only do they ‘remake the
ritual, but the ritual also transforms them’ (2010: 70).
11 The new law was fairly short compared with its predecessor law of 1117, which provided a very
detailed explanation of the legal procedures of tobacco production and exchange in 120 articles.
While in the law of 1777, 23 articles were about tobacco production, 17 articles were about
handling the tobacco marketing and 32 articles were regarding regulation of the miscellaneous
issues. In the new law, there is only one article about the production and marketing of tobacco
(Gümüş 2004: 28–29).
12 Best (2008, 2012) argues that international ﬁnancial institutions are never perfectly precise about
their policies. Their ambivalent attitude to ambiguity cultivates multiple interpretations of policies.
Therefore, uncertainty does not always appear as a problem to be tackled but also sometimes it is
considered as a possibility. While bureaucracies seek to contain uncertainty, they might at the same
time strategically retain and use it in institutional battles. Different forms of ‘strategic ignorance’
(McGoey 2007) help both to maintain and to disrupt social and political orders.
EXPERTS, CIGARETTES AND POLICYMAKING IN TURKEY 483
© 2013 European Association of Social Anthropologists.
cannot expect regulatory agencies, or any sort of institution, to undertake their policies
in an apolitical setting. This argument, however, should not be extended to a point that
these bodies are merely pursuing the interests of a certain party. Such a deterministic
approach oversimpliﬁes the decisionmaking process through attributing all the power
to the human actors working with predetermined agendas and possessing full control
to generate the desired policies.
Drawing from the works of Latour, I argue that the policymaking practices of the
agency are not determined by any overarching structures or by actors holding interests.
The occurrence of controversies illustrates the fact that any pre-ordering attempt is
doomed to fail, and the decisionmaking process is continuing endlessly through a
myriad of interactions between various actors. Latour’s anthropology abandons all a
priori social explanations that are used to explain society. All the well-known social
categories (such as class, ethnicity and gender) are rejected on the grounds that such
distinctions may be the result of analysis but not its departure. In other words, Latour
is ‘against “the social” as a sui generis kind and as a prior explanatory resource rather
than an achievement to be explained’ (Oppenheim 2007: 474).
Latour (2005a) replaces a ‘sociology of the social’ with a ‘sociology of associations’
by switching from meta-theoretical explanations to empirical case studies. In the
‘sociology of associations’, the focus is being shifted from the groups of mere humans
to assemblages of humans and non-humans. Agency is extended to non-human actors:
to bacteria (1988), automatic door closers (1992) and public transport systems (1996b).
‘The missing masses’ that have been ignored so far in social sciences are included in the
study of networks. This democratisation of actors reasonably brings about the criticism
of the idea that human beings are granted full power over non-humans. Here what
Latour proposes is the exploration of the inextricable interwovenness between different
actants. According to him, the actions can not be reduced to ‘what “intentional”,
“meaningful” humans do’ (2005a: 71), or to social structures, but they emerge from a
variety of interactions and reciprocal transformations of human and non-human actors.
Action, in short, is ‘not a property of humans but of an association of actants’ (Latour
1999b: 182; italics in original). Therefore, as a method, Latour suggests tracking
multiple associations and investigating their interaction in a network.
In a similar vein, this research illustrates how the regulatory decisions are being made
within a heterogeneous network of both human and non-human actors. Hard-box
cigarette packing machines gathered around themselves ‘a different assembly of relevant
parties’ and they ‘trigger new occasions to passionately differ and dispute’ (Latour
2005b: 15). These machines are not the perfect examples of Latour’s actants, which work,
break or stop against the will and control of human beings. They hold, however, an
extremely important role in terms of creating an assembly of heterogeneous actors: the
related parties were not limited to the institutions and companies but also included
bureaucrats and private sector stakeholders, experts, cigarette machines, and technical
reports. The regulation process has evolved with struggles and conﬂicts through the
formation of coalitions and counter-movements among these actors.
C iga r e t t e mach i n e s
During the ﬁeldwork, I accompanied tobacco experts on their trips to several villages,
towns and cities. The Tobacco Experts Association, established in 1948, was highly
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political and active in terms of defending the interests of the profession. Sometimes our
visits were undertaken for technical purposes, such as to the tobacco ﬁelds to report on
the condition of the current year’s crop, and sometimes to the ofﬁces of the tobacco
monopoly in various cities to inform other experts about developments in the sector.
One of our longest trips lasted more than ten days and included towns and cities from
central Anatolia to the Black Sea region, ending with a visit to the biggest cigarette
factory of the tobacco monopoly. After meeting with other experts and visiting the
factory, the long day ended with a dinner party thrown in honour of the experts in a
big nightclub/restaurant. As the only female at the table with about ten tobacco
experts, I was fairly uncomfortable with the atmosphere, including the high volume
of the music, the tobacco experts’ conversations with each other, which entirely
ignored my presence, and worst of all, the inebriated ofﬁcer on the other side of the
table, who was the general director of the factory. When he asked the chief engineer
to come and sit next to him, the tension at the table intensiﬁed. Anxious heads turned
to them because everybody at the table knew that they did not get along. In addition to
the conﬂict of interests over certain promotions as well as divergence in political
stances, their crucial disagreement happened to be over a recent scandal about the
machines that were bought for the monopoly’s factories. After ten minutes, the two
men’s inaudible conversation turned into a loud disagreement, followed by yelling,
screaming and cursing at each other. When other experts left their chairs and tried to
calm them down, the general director of the factory unexpectedly turned to me and
started to tell me about the ‘realities of the scandal’. My status surprisingly shifted from
that of a non-existent woman to an outsider who could impartially judge who was right
and wrong. As I was unable to understand what he was saying and was unaware of the
details of the scandal at the time, I decided to research this incident in the following
days. My investigation would now rely on gossip, speculation, newspaper clippings
and informal talks (as the most ‘objective knowledge’), since formal interviews on this
issue were either prohibited or sidestepped.
The experts’ argument was about the tobacco monopoly’s purchase of hard-box
cigarette packing machines. In the 1990s, the tobacco monopoly had a very established
place in the Turkish and world market as the ﬁfth largest cigarette producer (Tekel
1999). Having been the only tobacco company in the country for years, the monopoly
did not develop any market strategies. As a Philip Morris ofﬁcer explained to me, the
monopoly’s market strategy was ‘a joke’. With investments of multinational cigarette
manufacturers in Turkey, the tobacco market had become more competitive and the
monopoly administration felt the need to update its current technology. As a result,
the monopoly administration signed an agreement with a Spanish company to buy
eight hard-box cigarette packing machines in June 2004 for its biggest factory in Tokat.
The total cost of the machines, 13.8 million Euros, was scheduled to be paid off over
four years.
The controversy about the machines ﬁrst started in the Turkish parliament when a
deputy13 questioned the status of the purchased equipment after speculation that the
machines were not brand-new, and he submitted an interpellation to the Minister of
Finance for possible corruption. The Minister responded stating that the machines,
according to the law, must be ‘new and unused’, and the inspection of such conditions
13 Dursun Akdemir from the True Path Party was the deputy who brought the issue to the Parlia-
ment on 30 September 2004 (interpellation number 7/3739).
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is primarily undertaken by the tobacco agency.14 In other words, the Minister simply
put the tobacco regulatory agency in charge even though checking the state of equip-
ment is not originally deﬁned under the agency’s responsibility. After being assigned
by the task, the agency sent its experts to the factory to inspect the machines. The
experts reported that the purchased machines were not actually brand-new and they
had to be returned to the exporting country within the following 60 days.15 This
decision triggered a huge row between the monopoly and the regulatory agency.
The monopoly and the agency, the two sides of the controversy, tried to support their
claims by resorting to technical reports written about the condition of the machines. The
ﬁrst report written by the tobacco agency experts in November 2004 stated that ‘the
chassis and skeleton of the machines are old and used; the machines were overhauled and
repaired’ and it also added that the machine parts were all derived from other machines.
The second report, requested by themonopoly from the engineers of the Istanbul Chamber
of Industry, was written in December 2004 and it declared that ‘no evidence is found that
the machines were used’. And, lastly, Istanbul Technical University wrote the third report
upon the request of the customs ofﬁce in July 2005. This last report was perplexing: ‘some
experts determined that the machines were produced before the date of their announced
date of production’, but ‘the machines are new and unused’. In other words, machines
might have been manufactured before the indicated date, but were not used.16 These three
reports and three groups of expert teams evidently contradict each other.
Using the second report as evidence that the machines were brand-new, the
monopoly administration applied to the court for the suspension of execution, i.e.
returning the machines to Spain. Upon the rejection of their application, they went
to a superior court. Later the machines were shipped back to Spain and several ofﬁcials
of the monopoly were sent to court. The high-ranking ofﬁcials of the monopoly
vehemently criticised the verdict on the grounds that it would leave the monopoly
behind its competitors and open the way for the cigarette multinationals to dominate
the market. The general director of the monopoly, who signed the agreement to import
the machines, blamed both the regulatory agency and the cigarette multinationals for
causing a huge loss to the state exchequer. According to him, the cigarette multina-
tionals Philip Morris and JTI were ‘playing a big game here’ and ‘trying to destroy
[the monopoly]’ (Bayer 2005a). This argument was followed by a series of accusations
that the regulatory agency was in alliance with, and even bribed by, the multinational
cigarette manufacturers. Several journalists claimed in their columns that this verdict
would not only scare away foreign investment but also damage state earnings (Uluç
2005; Ayaydın 2005). Having already been critical about the establishment of a regula-
tory agency under commitments made to the IMF and the World Bank, this perspec-
tive assumed that the agency was basically established to facilitate the interests of the
private sector. Several tobacco experts I have interviewed also stated that misconduct
and corruption might have taken place, but the involvement of the regulatory agency
in this case was wrong since what the monopoly was doing, corrupt or not, had a
nationalistic purpose, i.e. strengthening the position of the tobacco monopoly vis-à-vis
14 The answer of the Minister of Finance, Kemal Unakıtan, on 3 November 2004 (number 7/3739).
15 The new tobacco law was unclear about the conditions of the equipment. According to the source
article, only prospective cigarette companies intending to establish new factories should have
brand-new equipment. On the other hand, the situation about investing in old machinery for
existing cigarette companies, including the monopoly, is not speciﬁed in the law.
16 For details, see Bayer (2005b).
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the multinational cigarette companies. According to this argument, the regulatory agency,
as an institution of the Turkish state, should have been on the side of the monopoly. The
pretext of the incident was what the bureaucrats and politicians had donemight have been
wrong, but the end result of the ‘corrupt action’ would have been for the beneﬁt of the
entire nation. The regulatory agency was blamed for not loving the country enough.17
The ambiguity of the related tobacco law, the lack of knowledge about the
functioning of the regulatory agency and the on-going confusion about the status of
machines have made it too difﬁcult to set a clear itinerary about the regulation.
Although there was no clear requirement that the agency had to check the status of
the machines bought for factories, the agency later on would be called to take action.
Subsequently, another responsibility of the agency would be deﬁned during a contro-
versy. What I am trying to say is that the policy has come to the scene following the
practices of several actors in a heterogeneous network, including the tobacco monop-
oly, multinational manufacturers, the Ministry of Finance, the tobacco experts, the
hard-box cigarette packing machines and technical reports. As Mosse (2004) argues, in-
stitutional practices are not always driven by policies, but instead practices are generat-
ing policies. Simply put, the policy is not initiated according to a predesigned model
but is an outcome of the practices. The consistency attributed to the policy is consti-
tuted in retrospect through political acts of composition (Latour 2000). Therefore,
the policy is made through a process with the involvement and interaction of a different
range of actors rather than as a ‘ready-made policy’ of either national or global order.
Assessmen t
When I visited the Ankara ofﬁce of one of the biggest multinational cigarette manufac-
turers on a crisp winter day, a surprise was awaiting me. I had got used to the half-
hearted and hasty interviews with the companies’ representatives, which provided me
with nothing more than I could have learned from newspapers. I was amazed to see
two company representatives for Turkey as well as the company’s Middle East regional
director ready to conduct a two-hour interview. Though they were fairly timid about
their policies, standards, blends and market strategies (in short, anything about their
company), they were brave in their statements about the government, other cigarette
companies and particularly about the tobacco regulatory agency. The company repre-
sentatives reiterated several times that the tobacco sector must be regulated ‘for the
predictability and stability of the market’. However, what people understood by regu-
lation, they continued, was different from one to the other. Their approach towards
regulation was more like tailoring the laws in a way that would make ‘everybody in
the sector play according to rules’. It was basically a technical regulation that would
facilitate the functioning of the free market. In this respect, the agency did not know
how to regulate the market, because their operations were concentrated on policies
of banning18 rather than of regulating. The representatives stated that the agency’s
17 One of the most striking points about this row is the revelation of faultlines and struggles within
the state bureaucracy (Herzfeld 2005). The state is not a homogenous, monolithic and uniform ap-
paratus in which all actors work in harmony with each other.
18 The company representatives explained this with a speciﬁc example. The incessant changes in the
taxation policy let several groceries make up ‘fake’ price increases. The multinationals wanted to
inform smokers about their prices by giving advertisements in newspapers so that consumers
would not fall into the price traps of several sellers. However, their attempts were prevented by
the agency on grounds that any sort of advertisement on tobacco was illegal.
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personnel were not competent enough and their market vision was restricted to the
traditional bureaucratic administration:
They are trying to regulate a sector that they don’t know anything about. The
board is very incompetent. On the other side, the employees of multinationals
know the sector very well but they are not represented on the board. If there
were a few people from the multinationals on the board, the sector would not
be like this.
I heard the same comments whenever I interviewed anyone from the cigarette
multinationals. As being regulated, multinational cigarette manufacturers would like
to be the regulators, too. Adamantly supporting the argument that their presence on
the board would sustain a truly effective regulation, they seemed to be unaware of
how this idea might be problematic.19 All of the ofﬁcials I interviewed legitimised their
argument on the basis of the ineffectiveness of the regulatory agency: ‘Every year, the
European Union directorate informs the regulatory agency about certain issues but the
people at the institution don’t know what to do with this [information].’ According to
the multinationals, the strong bureaucratic tradition with its uncreative and monoto-
nous way of functioning – such as doing paperwork, running daily errands, working
in a hierarchical order – has overshadowed the effective performance of the regulatory
agency. The major obstruction stemmed from the old bureaucratic understanding of
the personnel, who were accustomed to working in an uncreative, non-risky and
passive environment. Fraught with the bureaucratic culture from their earlier experiences,
they were unable to catch up with the speed and spirit of the free market economy.
This was the approach of the multinationals. However, even several employees
working in the agency complained about the lethargic and submissive attitude of
members on the regulatory board. The tobacco law might be short in length, but for
them it was ﬂexible enough to work well in the sector if desired. The board could have
been more actively engaged in the sector if the members of the board were different.
They considered the agency to be an institution that lacked a genuine vision of the free
market economy and that was still devoted to the state-controlled economy. In other
words, the state tradition was infused in the agency.
On the other hand, government ofﬁcials, especially the bureaucrats of the Ministry
of Finance, have treated the regulatory agency with scepticism since the institution was
established under commitments made to the IMF and the World Bank. They have
taken for granted that the agency would favour and facilitate the multinationals’
policies. They argued that the agency simply helped the multinationals to dominate
the market through weakening the monopoly’s competitive power, as happened in
the incident of abrogation of the sales of hard-box cigarette packing machines.
In conclusion, we can say that both perspectives have the problem of approaching
the issue from the point of a priori ﬁxed structures. They both assume more or less
essentialised national and global frameworks. Yet, rather than explaining the operation
of the agency with the interactions of pre-made structures at national and global levels,
what we encounter is policymaking in an assemblage that involves different actors,
spaces and temporalities. The role of the agency was not predetermined but, instead,
its role has been deﬁned and redeﬁned according to the slippery relationships between
19 This might lead to ‘regulatory capture’, which means that the particular interests of regulated com-
panies can capture the goals and interests of regulatory agencies.
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different actors in the sector. The agency was carrying on its ‘duties’ on the basis of
regular interactions between a multitude of actors. Under the pressure of massive
uncertainty and ambiguity, the agency had to depend on its assessments of other actors’
actions in the market. When faced with a problem, the agency had no choice but to
solve the problem by trial and error. In brief, its performance has been grounded in
momentary practices. In opposition to the argument that policies are designed to be
rational, structured and well thought-out ideas, the ethnographic research suggests that
a myriad of interactions emerging in a heterogeneous network have a governing role in
policymaking. When the activities of the agency are observed, what we encounter is an
improvised version of policymaking that is being shaped through a series of interac-
tions between different actors, rather than coherent, stable and straightforward systems
of national policy or global governance.
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